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Abstract 
This thesis examines the implications of Friedrich Hayek's assertion 
of liberty as the supreme value. The definition of individual liberty 
and coercion represents a crucial determinant of his social theory. 
Society exists as a spontaneous order, where knowledge is disseminated 
and utilised through the market. The participants in the market process 
are an association of free individuals, regulated by a body of abstract 
and universally applicable laws. Each individual must be guaranteed the 
maximum degree of freedom that is equal to and compatible with all other 
individuals. The benefits of individual freedom are intended to 
encourage individual responsibility and allow for the greatest possible 
amount of discoveries for the improvement of society. The emergence of 
new processes and technologies ls a result of the spontaneous order of 
free individuals. 
Hayek's assertion of the connection between individual freedom and 
invention is correct, although totalitarian societies are still capable 
of progress. However Hayek's theory has serious flaws and 
inconsistencies. His definition of freedom, as an absence of arbitrary 
coercion, is inadequate for the requirements of individual self-
determination. The reliance on universal laws as a guarantee against 
coercion is misplaced. Alternately he is inconsistent with his claim of 
the coercive powers of the state and trade unions as intolerable while 
the coercive nature of the market is acceptable. Monopolies and cartels 
created by the market are incompatible with liberty. Hayek's reliance on 
competition will not always secure freedom for those individuals who do 
not have the opportunities to pursue their particular ends. 
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Preface 
My original intention when beginning my thesis was to try and refute 
the arguments of Neo-liberal theorists, with their insistence of the 
market exchange process has the primary structure in the distribution of 
resources. Freidrich Hayek's social theory represented, to me one of the 
most comprehensive and realistic interpretations of capitalism. I 
believed his assumption of liberty as the supreme value forms the basis 
of his social and economic theories. A closer examination of the concept 
of liberty, as an absence of arbitrary coercion, reveals weaknesses and 
inconsistencies which undermine his theories of equality and the proper 
role of government. My intention was to concentrate primarily on the 
arguments of liberty and coercion, in so doing I have excluded a more in 
depth discussion on the role of government, which in hindsight would 
have been appropriate to include. I found when reviewing my thesis, that 
I concentrated on the works of C. Kukathas and N. Barry whose analysis 
of Hayek 's theory of liberty I found excellent and they discussed the 
particular aspect of the subject that I wished to discuss. I also found 
T. Gray's analysis of liberty to be very useful when comparing the 
different types of liberty. 
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List of Abbreviations 
References to the principal books of Hayek, have followed a 
system similar to other works on Hayek. The letters below are 
abbreviations of a particular title, using the Harvard method. 
(Full citations of these works are found in the bibliography.) 
CL The Constitution of Liberty 
FC The Fatal Conceit 
MSJ The Mirage of Social Justice 
NS New studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics 
and the History of Ideas 
POFP The Poli ti cal Order of a Free People 
RO Rules and Order 
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Introduction 
Every society is confronted with the dilemma of ensuring the most 
appropriate outcomes for each individual, endeavouring to accommodate 
the differing and often competing individual preferences. A continuous 
search for the most efficient and effective means in achieving this 
goal, results in conflict between many competing ideas. The supremacy of 
the capitalist market structure has undermined the socialist system of 
production, as a means of distributing resources, from the ideological 
debate. A new consensus has formed on the general operations and dutie s 
of the state as secondary to that of the market. The most appropriate 
role for the state in determining the boundaries of the market and the 
degree of alteration in the outcomes of market operations has yet to be 
determined. As the market is an essentially neutral exchange procedure, 
it is the participants, namely the buyer and seller proceeding from a 
historical process of cumulative market transactions, who encompass the 
central problem of fair ness when judging market outcomes . 
The role of the state or government ( these terms wi 11 be used 
inter-changeably) is crucial, since it places limitations on the freedom 
of individuals to act within the market process subsequently altering 
the outcomes. The government can act primarily as a constitutive 
organisation developing legislation, regulating the operation of the 
market and ensuring effective compliance with the rule of law. 
Government can also act as a facilitator, improving the opportunities of 
market participants, by providing resources for individuals to 
participate with a greater degree of equality. This is especially 
applicable in the fields of health and education, both are goods that 
are expensive for the individual or family to procure. Although private 
goods, they are necessary, not only to improve the quality of life for 
the individual, but their supply provides positive benefits for society 
overall and can be considered social goods. 
It i s t he redistribution, by government, of resources or social 
goods amongs t the market participants, that results in controversy. 
New-Right theorists argue the state has only a limited role in this 
area, however failure to act generally causes a more pronounced 
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inequality between the powerful (those that have greater access to 
resources} and the powerless ( those that do not}. The theorists who 
argue principally for non-intervention believe freedom can only be 
guaranteed for the individual through the most efficient operation of 
the market process. This may entail unsatisfactory outcomes for some 
individuals, but overall the outcome is beneficial in the long term for 
everyone, by eventually improving prosperity and increasing living 
standards. 
The argument between allowing individuals to choose and act on their 
preferences without hindrance from the state and the necessity of 
collectively providing a level of resources for individuals, within a 
context of individual liberty, is the principal debate of this thesis. 
This argument centres on the level of personal freedom or liberty (these 
terms will be used interchangeably} that is available to the individual, 
recognising an individual is automatically constrained within a social 
context by rules, the actions of others and the availability of talent 
and oppor t unities. Generally it can be stated society recognise s 
fundamental inequalities and seeks to alleviate them by providing 
resources or preventing the accumulation of unfair privilege. It is the 
methods used to alter these inequalities that causes controversy. One 
argument proposes that the unhindered operation of the market will 
eventually provide improved living standards through changing 
technology. Other arguments favour the state actively intervening t o 
alter the distribution of social goods in the short term, on the basis 
of a predetermined equality. 
This debate begins with a discussion on Friedrich Hayek's theory of 
the development of society as a spontaneous order. Hayek's social theory 
represents one of the most comprehensive and complex discussions on the 
role of the individual and the state within a New-right or Neo-liberal 
framework. The discuss ion wi 11 primarily concentrate on Hayek' s 
definition of liberty as an absence of arbitrary coercion, or 
alternatively, individual freedom exists within a framework of general 
rules guaranteeing a private sphere free of interference. In reply an 
argument will be developed that considers Hayek's assumptions 
fundamentally inadequate for the purpose of ensuring a prosperous 
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society. The complex nature of industrial society, engaging both 
individuals and organisations, is reliant upon an increasingly 
complicated process of production, requiring highly trained individuals 
whose lengthy education requires a considerable amount of government 
investment in which the individuals themselves and private firms would 
be unwilling to undertake. It is the coordination of individuals, and 
private and state organisations that provides the basis for the 
successful functioning of the market process. 
A brief and introductory review is required to understand the 
considerable importance Hayek placed on society having evolved as a 
product of a spontaneous order. It is impossible for individuals or 
organisations to acquire all possible knowledge for the production and 
consumption of goods. It is from this context of ignorance that the 
market, involving the price mechanism, is used to gather and disperse 
information for the individual participants, this facilitates the 
discovery process for the development of new ideas, institutions and 
technologies, resulting in the eventual distribution of its benefits for 
all, if somewhat unequally. Unlike other theories that assert perfect 
competition is possible when equilibrium is attained, Hayek believed the 
purpose of competition was a discovery process, involving a continuous 
process of trial and error that would rarely achieve a stable 
equilibrium. The market is controlled by unspecified, abstract rules 
applicable to everyone, these rules have developed as part of the 
spontaneous order, similar to the development of new technology and 
forms part of a the natural progression of development. Hayek considered 
society as pluralistic with a multiplicity of individual ends that is 
unable to be reconciled through central direction. The market device is 
used to organise and arrange in preferential order, the use of scarce 
resources for each individual to pursue their own ends. 
This is not a comprehensive overview of Hayek's social and economic 
theory, his epistemological, legal and economic theories are only 
included when they have direct relevance to his discussion on liberty 
and coercion. Although Hayek appears as a rigorous proponent of market 
capitalism, concomitantly asserting a limited role for the state, he had 
a tendency to issue dogmatic statements and then qualify these with 
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exceptions and allowances for certain circumstances. This could lead to 
charges of inconsistency, however he was trying to make his theories 
resemble a complex and often inconsistent and contradictory society. He 
continuously advocates private provision of welfare, by connecting 
individual liberty with personal responsibility and eschewing collective 
responsibility. However he acknowledged there are individuals unable to 
provide for themselves and this requires a form of state intervention to 
alleviate at least those suffering 'severe deprivation'. (MSJ:p.87) 
Critical to Hayek' s understanding and political philosophy is his 
concept of liberty. To disagree with his definition of liberty 
automatically questions the relationship of the individual with society, 
the market and the organising principles of government and its 
consequent authority derived by law. Individual liberty is the supreme 
principle for Hayek, and it rests on the definition as an absence of 
arbitrary coercion by other individuals and the state. Other definitions 
will be used as a comparison and consequently the distribution of 
liberty advocated by Hayek will be examined. Essentially, the 
distribution of freedom is guaranteed through the existence of general, 
non-discriminatory laws applicable to all. Individual freedom cannot be 
bargained with other values such as equality, as this implies a 
redistribution of freedom, through such measures as progressive 
taxation, which is considered morally wrong and unjustifiable. 
Hayek believed a private or protected domain could be established, 
in which the individual is assured freedom of action and freedom from 
arbitrary coercion. However he modifies his definition by justifying 
some forms of coercive activity, such as taxation, by the state. The 
possibility of other forms of acceptable and unacceptable coercion by 
institutions including enterprise monopolies and trade unions will be 
examined. 
The principal er i tic isms wi 11 centre on the inadequacy of the 
definition of freedom as an absence of arbitrary coercion, and will 
argue for the inclusion of an additional definition of freedom as self-
determination. The formulation of general laws both as a determinant and 
a protector of individual liberty will be examined, arguing the rule of 
law is as liable for capture by vested interests as any other government 
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process and also Hayek has failed to ensure all laws, despite being 
general and equal are not oppressive. Hayek' s justification of 
enterprise monopolies as not being coercive, whereas other monopolies 
are considered coercive, will be examined. The assumption that market 
transactions undertaken by participants are free, if they are undertaken 
within a competitive market, is an indefensible assertion by Hayek, as 
it fails to recognise the fundamental inequality inherent within the 
process. Some individuals are powerless to alter their contractual 
agreements, such as labour contracts, despite the possibility of their 
being inequitable. Hayek would appear to disagree with any attempt, by 
the state or any other organisation, to alter these "freely contracted 
arrangements", even if they improved the quality of life for the 
individual and overall standard of living for society. 
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PART I 
LIBERTY 
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The considerable effort Hayek expounded in defining freedom, and its 
obverse, coercion, is evidenced by his significant work The Constitution 
of Liberty. It was a theme he repeatedly considered in later books and 
articles and remained in essence unaltered and constant. The fundamental 
assumptions derived from Hayek 's conception of freedom are crucial in 
the development of his social and economic theory. Individual freedom 
exists prior to other ideals and theories, it cannot be traded or 
compromised. Liberty is the principal ideal for the development of law, 
the preservation of the market process and the basis of individual 
relationships between people and organisations. 
Individual liberty describes the level of action permissible for 
each individual, the social environment both constrains and enhances 
liberty. The problem is determining the most appropriate levels of 
interference or constraint by other individuals and organisations. A 
useful classification for comparison is that of Berlin's two concepts of 
negative and pos itive liberty (Berlin:1969) . The negative version can be 
defined as fr eedom from s omething or an absence of restraint and the 
positive interpretation is defined as freedom to act. This requires an 
enlargement in the range of opportunities, that can be altered by human 
agency, to allow a greater number of possibilities for the individual in 
the exercising of his or her liberty in a meaningful sense. 
Defining Liberty 
It is useful to to begin by categorising Hayek's concept of liberty 
as part of the negative or liberal tradition, in the sense of an 
individual pursuing an inclination without interference. The process of 
forming these inclinations are conducted within a boundary of abstract 
socially derived rules. However, Hayek immediately modifies this 
definition, by recognising that the inevitable participation of 
individuals within a society creates restraint in one form or another. 
Hayek r ecogni ses the limitations placed on an individuals actions by the 
innate paradox of being human. To be human is to be automatically a 
participant in the actions of others. Therefore the process of 
participation in a society of others, is to be constrained by them. 
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"The liberal conception of freedom was therefore necessarily one of 
freedom under a law which limited the freedom of each so as to secure 
the same freedom for all." (NS: p .133) Recognising these constraints 
Hayek makes the distinction between an individual who is restrained from 
a particular course of action and one who is coerced by an others wi 11 
into following a course of action, both are equally deleterious towards 
individual liberty. (CL:p.16) He then describes the acceptable limits of 
coercion by others upon the individual and more specifically, the limits 
of coercion by governments. (This will be discussed below in Part 2.) 
Complete freedom of action in a social context is impossible, and there 
are certain conditions that must be met before a person is considered to 
be 'acting without constraint'. These conditions which guide a persons 
actions are; a guarantee of voluntary action and the agreement to abide 
by socially derived laws. 
"For Hayek, this implies that rules of law--general, abstract 
rules laid down in advance of the particular activities they are 
meant t o r egulate--are not coercive, for such laws do not direct 
behaviour but are mer ely conditions that a person takes into 
account when deciding how to act. Thus in Hayek's view a liberal 
political order, composed entirely of such rules, imposes no 
limits a t all on negative liberty in the proper sense of that 
term." (Miller:1991:p.14) 
At its most fundamental, Hayek's definition of freedom is defined as 
"the state in which a man [or woman) is not subject to coercion by the 
arbitrary will of another or others " (CL:p.11). Acknowledging a 
complete absence is impossible, therefore the task of all societies is 
to minimise coercion as much as possible. Arbitrary coercion by others 
is abhorred, and coercion by the state must be kept to a minimum, with 
the impartial implementation of universal laws to protect the individual 
and encourage co-operation between individuals and groups. 
The individual exists as a social being, therefore constraint by 
others i s inevitable. Thi s issue is one of interpersonal freedom, which 
Hayek analyses in the greatest detail, as it is this form of freedom 
which is the most relevant in a social and therefore political context. 
In addition Hayek considers alternative forms of liberty, the separate 
- -- --- ------- - - --- ------ ---
9 
although related issue of intrapersonal or psychological freedom. Hayek 
briefly discusses the individual impeded by personal psychological 
constraints, in the form of being guided by emotion instead of reason. 
(CL:p.15) As Hayek is primarily concerned with questions of social 
organisation, psychological constraint is not examined in any detail. 
Another form of intrapersonal freedom is that of the individual 
constrained by his or her abilities and circumstances, Hayek uses an 
analogy of a rock climber (CL:p.11-12) to explain the inevitability of 
restraint involving ones actions because of the individual's specific 
abilities or lack of them. These constraints are individualised and 
personal and should not be altered or improved through government 
intervention, in what he believed to be the fruitless pursuit of 
equality of outcomes by providing resources to improve an individuals 
opportunities. Although an individual maybe constrained, Hayek maintains 
it is not through lack of personal choice or opportunity. 
"Whether he [or she] is free or not does not depend on the range 
of choice but on whether he [or she] can expect to shape his [or 
her] course of action in accordance with his [or her] present 
intentions, or somebody else has power so to manipulate the 
conditions as to make him [or her] act according to that person's 
will rather than his [or her] own." (CL:p.13) 
This issue of choice is closely aligned with the availability of 
opportunities and the resources required to enhance an individual's 
abilities when choosing and pursuing his or her actions. Hayek refers to 
this as "liberty as power" (CL:p.16) Although dismissing any claims upon 
society to provide these opportunities, he did acknowledge the necessity 
of the state providing some form of education for children, presumably 
to alleviate social and economic disadvantage. 
"There is also much to be said in favour of the government 
providing on an equal basis the means for the schooling of minors 
who are not yet fully responsible citizens, even though there are 
grave doubts whether we ought to allow governments to administer 
them." (MSJ:p.84) 
This would appear to be one of the few concessions Hayek acknowledges on 
the inequalities inherent within a society based on a market order. A 
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continuous theme repeatedly stated is the inadvisabi 1 i ty of government 
changing existing patterns of resource distribution to negate the 
influence of ones family fortunes and of ones natural talents. As this 
process would require a large degree of government intervention to 
ensure that everyone is relatively equal. Hayek's dismissivness of 
"liberty as power" referring to " ... the dreams of many people in the 
form of the illusion that they can fly ... " (CL:p.16) indicates the 
contempt in which he holds the concept of 'freedom as an availability of 
choices'. Although Hayek's definition of liberty is effective in its 
simplicity, it ignores the complexity of the human situation and all the 
myriad influences upon a person's ability to utilise their resources to 
achieve what they choose. This issue will be considered in greater 
detail below, when examining the distribution of liberty and other 
alternative forms of individual freedom. 
Hayek sought to isolate and undermine the concept of liberty 'as 
availability of choices' and other 'liberty as power' concepts, such as 
'liberty as self -determination'. To accept an alternative defin i tion 
might establish a causal connection between liberty and social just ice 
or equality. Associating the concept of liberty with the need for wealth 
to enhance an individual's liberty by providing greater choice, would 
encourage a redistribution of society's resources via the state , an 
alternative Hayek vigorously opposed. (CL:p.17) For Hayek the only 
concept of liberty possible is, an absence of coercive influence, this 
exists as the pre-eminent concept in his system of social thought and 
morality. 
"In the context of morality Hayek stresses that not only is 
_liberty the supreme value but it is also the condition for other 
values. This means that a society is to be evaluated in accordance 
with freedom and not in accordance with some other trade - off 
between, for example freedom and social justice or by a criterion 
of 'economic efficiency'." (Barry:1979:p.55) 
Personal liberty, therefore, should have precedence over ot her soci etal 
or state ambitions to change the outcomes resulting from mar ket 
operations. This interpretation undermines the justification for the 
necessity of the welfare state, an additional criticism is that the 
welfare state diminishes individual responsibi 1 i ty and 
according to Hayek, essential for the preservation 
I liberty. (Barry:1979:p.55) u 
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choice, both, 
of individual 
In practical terms individual liberty consists of: equal legal 
status as a member of a community; immunity from arbitrary arrest; the 
rights of movement, choice of occupation and to own property. (CL:p.20) 
One assumes the freedom to form contracts should also be included as it 
is usually a fundamental tenet of the classical liberal tradition. The 
most notable exclusion from this list is political freedom, such as the 
right to vote and form political parties. Hayek regarded the public 
sphere of politics as an unwarranted intrusion into the private sphere 
of individuals, and consequently their decision-making within the 
market. However, Barry among others, considers it unusual for any 
definition of liberty to exclude political freedoms. (Barry:1979:p.58) 
Part of Hayek's distrust for political liberties is derived from what he 
perceived as the increasing encroachment of public or legislative and 
bureaucratic involvement in what should be the private world of 
individual choice and decision- making. The distinction between 
individuals pursuing their own goals within a framework of general 
abstract rules and individuals directed to pursue centrally determined 
goals is crucial. This private world or protected domain consists of 
law, including contracts, and property . It is the ownership of private 
property, including labour as well as physical resources, which 
guarantees liberty. (Barry:1979:p.61) 
Individual liberty cannot be constrained by law or by the agents of 
the state if they are acting in accordance with the legislature. This 
assumes the rule - of law is non-spec£ ic and applied equally to all. 
"Rules of law are not coercive, for such laws do not direct human 
behaviour but are merely conditions that a person takes into account 
when deciding how to act." (Miller:1991:p.14) This is a significant 
departure from other concepts of negative liberty, these are us4,ally 
interpreted as an absence of re s traint or impediment. 
" ... Hayek in a very important sense, does not necessarily regard 
laws as constituting restraints. Thus freedom does not depend upon 
the range of choice open to the individual (the orthodox view does 
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measure liberty in terms of the absence of law) but in whether 
the restraint is of human origin. Under a rightly constituted 
legal order the notions of law and liberty are consistent." 
(Barry:1979:p.57-8) 
The rule of law forms an important basis for the practical determinants 
of liberty. A principal criticism of the primacy of law is that a 
general law applied equally can still be severely restrictive of 
individual liberty. These general rules or laws may also contradict the 
right to own property and the right to enter a contract. For example the 
prohibition laws on the sale of liquor in the early twentieth century, 
although created with the best intentions where regarded as intrusive, 
continuously ignored and eventually overturned. (Miller:1991:p.15) The 
connection between liberty and the rule of law will be examined in 
greater detail below. 
Liberty as the Supreme Principle 
Hayek believed the concept of liberty is the pre-eminent value in a 
society of individuals, indeed it is the source and condition of most 
values. (CL:p.6) Kukathas has identified three main claims formulated by 
Hayek in support of the previous statement; liberty is not incompatible 
with order, any interference with individual liberty to alter 
dis tr ibuti ve patterns would negatively affect any benefits from the 
spontaneous order and finally liberty is not only necessary for well -
being but essential for developing the individual's capacities of 
discovery and consequent practical application in the market-place. 
(Kukathas:1989: p.131-132) (The latter claim is discussed more fully in 
the next section.) 
Hayek sought to separate and protect liberty from the encroachment 
of collective decision-making and what was currently expedient for the 
majority in control of the legislative process. 
"The most important among the few principles of this kind that we 
have developed is individual freedom, which it is most appropriate 
t o regard as a moral principle of political action. Like all moral 
principles, it demands that it be accepted as a value in itself, 
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as a principle that must be respected without our asking whether 
the consequences in the particular instance will be beneficial." 
(CL:p.68) 
Unlike utilitarian interpretations of freedom, individual liberty cannot 
be diminished for the improvement of overall utility. Presumably an 
improvement in universal happiness cannot compensate for a small loss in 
individual liberty. Nor can liberty be reduced for improvements in 
efficiency that may only be temporarily provided by monopolistic 
government provision. Individual liberty should be an overriding 
principle for all legislation. It cannot be aggregated and apportioned 
between competing demands for resources. 
"This freedom thus conferred on all judged responsible for their 
actions also held them responsible for their own fate: while the 
protection of the law was to assist all in their pursuit of their 
aims, government was not supposed to guarantee to the individuals 
particular results of their efforts." (NS:p.133) 
Hayek was arguing against any possible justification by government in 
redistributing opportunities, as this action would favour particular 
interests or groups of people. All government actions should be 
universal in application. 
However the essential importance of freedom, is the engine of 
progress within a spontaneous order of differing ends. Kukathas's 
interpretation of Hayek 's main argument in support of liberty, is one 
based on ignorance. It is impossible for all individuals to know or even 
agree on what they want, and they must have the freedom of the 
decentralised market to coordinate the many disparate opportunities 
available. "The value of freedom is that it facilitates the co~ 
ordination of this knowledge and, indeed, enables individuals to 
discover knowledge." (Kukathas:1989:p.132) Therefore the value of 
freedom is in providing the opportunity and incentive for individuals to 
maximise the acquisiti on of knowledge, not only for their advantage but 
also society' s . The dispersal of knowledge, through the market, not only 
acts for the advantage of individuals and groups by increasing their 
ability to adapt to change and uncertainty, it also provides for the 
introduction and modification of new technologies, institutions and 
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rules, culminating in greater complexity, innovation and competition. 
"He [Hayek] is attempting to argue that what is valuable about 
human life is manifested in individual activity, in the striving 
in which the individual extends his [or her] capacities to the 
full. Value resides in his [or herl seeking after, rather than in 
the achievement of, particular goals." (Kukatha s :1989:p.138) 
For the discovery process to be successful, it must be conducted with 
the minimum possible interference by others, especially by the state. 
Without liberty as the fundamental value, the spontaneous social order 
would be less effective in distributing informat i on. Hindering the 
efforts of individuals in the utilisation of information when choosing 
how to act. Because changing circumstances cannot be foreseen, it is 
impossible to plan and organise with any certainty, this anti-
rationalist approach of Hayek's will be explored in the next section. 
The Role of Liberty in the Spontaneous Order 
The value of individual liberty consists not only in t he ability to 
pursue a course of action without impediment, t his can be cons idered as 
a private good, but it also results in a publi c good or positive 
~xternality being produced. Societies which all ow t he greatest possible 
freedom of individually dir ected actions , enco urage invention and 
improvement. This adaptation is a result of the historical pr ocess being 
unpredictable, due to a changing environment, including natural and 
technological 
existence of 
changes, resulting in altered social conditions. The 
individual freedom allows for the largest number of 
alternative courses of action to choose from, enabling society to 
develop and improve institutions and technologies for advancing the 
quality of life of its citizens. "It is because freedom means the 
renunciation of direct control of individual efforts that a free society 
can make use of so much more knowledge than the mind of the wisest ruler 
could comprehend." (CL:p.31) Therefore freedom should be guaranteed for 
not only the few but for all, even if only a f ew individuals actually 
produce ideas for advancing social progress, this would enable the 
maximum number of possible ideas to be selected. (CL:p.32) 
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There exists a fundamental inconsistency with Hayek's conception of 
individual liberty, between the autonomous utility-maximising individual 
and the situated individual. The first makes choices in unpredictable 
circumstances and requires an absence of constraint unless voluntarily 
entered into. The other type, is that of an individual situated within a 
society, shaped by historical precepts accumulated through a body of 
tacit knowledge. (Rowland:1987:p.6) The asocial individual contrasted 
against the encumbered individual would appear contradictory, Hayek 
attempts to unify these antithetical elements to explain the 
epistemological transfer within a current society and between 
generations. The primary role of the asocial individual is that of a 
discoverer, inventing new methods and processes, accepting risks and 
rewards. The role of the encumbered individual is to use and transmit 
knowledge . 
This emphasis on the need for adaptability, because of uncertainty 
over fut ure developments, is derived from an empiricist and unsystematic 
traditi on of trial and error. This is compared to a rationally planned 
traditi on. 
"The us e of reason aims at control and predictability. But the 
pr ocess of the advance of reason rests on freedom and the 
unpredictability of human action ... for advance to take place, 
the social process from which the growth of reason emerges must 
remain free from its control." (CL:p.38) 
Although appearing contradictory Hayek sought to distance planning and 
control from the invention process. Progress derived through the 
transmis s ion of knowledge happens in an uncertain environment and is 
incapable of being predicted, but evolves spontaneously through constant 
invention and adaptation. 
"The rationalistic design theories were necessarily based on the 
assumption of the individual's propensity for rational action and 
his [or her] natural intelligence and goodness. The evolutionary 
the ory, on the contrary showed how certain institutional 
arr angements would induce man [or woman] to use his [or her] 
intelligence to the best effect ... " (CL:p.61) 
Therefore Hayek is fundamentally opposed to rationalism, the 
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organisation of society cannot be imposed by design, it must evolve 
through a process of competing ideas, the most suitable for the current 
conditions will be chosen and adopted. "We would destroy the foundation 
of much successful action if we disdained to rely on ways of doing 
things evolved by the process of trail and error simply because the 
reason for their adaptation has not been handed down to us." (CL:p.64) 
The process of selection and adoption of the most appropriate ideas 
is not explained fully by Hayek, and would seem to be based upon 
experiment and those ideas that are seemed the best are adopted on an ad 
hoc basis. The explanation offered, is that knowledge is disseminated 
through a market structure to allow for its most efficient utilisation 
by the many market participants. The emphasis on the participants of the 
market as the arbiters of what is useful, does not exclude a role for 
the state, whose principal role is to formulate laws and ensure their 
compliance. Capitalism is judged, by Hayek, as the most appropriate 
orgainising principle of social and economic activity. Allowing the 
transmission of knowledge caused by inventions, the benefits are 
simultaneously combined with the autonomy required by an individual when 
engaging in the discovery process. It is deemed both free and 
beneficial. Therefore Hayek's interpretation of society is a spontaneous 
order, forming a continuously evolving social group. Each individual is 
free to pursue his or her own concept of the good, regulated by a 
tradition of rules or principles from an accumulated store of knowledge. 
These rules, based on precedence, are added to and altered when 
necessary. Although Hayek is circumspect on the actual procedures 
involved in this change, it appears to be achieved gradually through 
social change, causing the -revision. It is this process of adaptation 
that constitutes human reason. 
"The case for liberty is not simply that it will lead to superior 
consequences which we can predict, and still less that the 
individual as a rational being is better able to identify his [or 
her] interests if left free to do so .... Rather, freedom is 
valued more because it facilitates the development of human 
rationality." (Kukathas:1989:p.139) 
Unsuprisingly Hayek is vigorously opposed to all socialist states 
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which seek to control the actions and economic choices of individuals. 
The rational operation of socialist central planning is incapable of 
using fragmented knowledge to the greatest advantage in the long run. 
The complexity of modern society requires a decentralisation of 
invention and practical application. These conditions, Hayek argues, can 
only be met by the experience of individual liberty within a market 
structure, " ... since much of human knowledge cannot be specifically 
organised, the knowledge of time and place in decentralised market 
economies is an example of unorganised knowledge, individuals in society 
require considerable freedom of action if it is to be utilised." 
(Barry:1979:p.68) An additional argument in favour of the necessity for 
the existence of individual freedom is in the creation of new ideas and 
technologies being freely available to everyone enabling a greater 
improvement in the quality of life for all societies. Everyone has the 
opportunity to use knowledge in their own activities, enabling them to 
indirectly contribute to the overall improvement of society. However 
Barry rai ses the problem, t ha t fr ee ly available kn owledge creat es a 
disincentive to invent and share. This problem is partly solved by the 
restrictive use of patents. However Hayek disapproved of monopolies 
created by patents as they slowed the process of adopting new 
technology. (Barry:1979:p.69) 
The reliance Hayek places on individual liberty as a necessary 
prerequisite for the historical progression and improvement of 
technologies and ins ti tut ions would seem misplaced. Using a historical 
basis of assessment, societies, whether they have been regarded as free 
or not, seem equally capable of designing weapons and ever more complex 
industrial technology. Hayek's reply, would be that in the wider 
historical context, decentralised societies, with market-based 
economies, achieve the most advancement through the spontaneous 
development of knowledge for use in the continuous evolvement of human 
progress. 
"The claim for freedom does not depend upon its observable and 
qua ntifiable consequences (and he [Hayek] insists that peopl e 
ought to be allowed to act freely within general rules even though 
we may disapprove of the consequences of their actions), but upon 
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freedom consistently pursued. The benefits may not be immediately 
obvious but in the long run the advantages of the system of 
liberty are obvious." (Barry:1979:p.69) 
Ultimately the final judgement can never be made. It would be impossible 
to successfully refute either the empiricist or the rationalist 
arguments, even though Hayek didactically insists upon the supremacy of 
the empiricist spontaneous order. Perhaps the distinction between the 
spontaneous order and that of the purposive design of social progress is 
illusionary and breaks down (Rowland:1987:p.68). 
Barry supports Hayek's interpretation of social progress as 
decentralised and unplanned, 
" ... [humans] did not think up a libertarian value system and 
deduce the necessary institutions from the values. It is rather 
the case that by accident men [or women] discovered the advantages 
of limiting the powers of their rulers and chose to extend, and 
indeed universalise the benefits of so doing." (Barry:1979:p.70) 
An alternative argument is, that written constitutions were originally 
formulated by design to assure individual freedom, by acting as a 
comparison for laws evolving from the spontaneous order. Government 
institutions are required to maintain order and improve the operations 
of the market, by redistributing benefits and costs. The arguments 
concerning progress by design or evolvement, are circuitous and 
impossible to prove or disprove. Again it would seem to depend on which 
philosophical system one adheres to. Societies tend to develop in a 
disorganised fashion, but this cannot diminish the role of the state or 
ideologies and other contributing factors, such as nationalism, which 
have sought to recognise and impose ideals. All aim to improve the lives 
of its citizens. 
The Rule of Law 
This section will consider the central role law provides in Hayek's 
interpretation of liberty. Unlike other negative definitions of freedom, 
Hayek does not consider rules or law as restrictive of liberty, if they 
adhere to the attributes of generality and equality. 
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"The goal of maximising liberty depends upon the reduction to a 
minimum of that area of an individual's life which is controlled 
by personalised central authorities. Thus law, properly 
understood, is not a barrier to individual liberty but a necessary 
condition of it." (Barry:1979:p.77} 
Therefore law both creates and secures the private domain from the 
arbitrary coercion of other individuals and institutions, enabling the 
individual to pursue his or her own particular ends without 
interference. 
"It was within the limits determined by these rules of just 
conduct that the individual was supposed to be free to use his [or 
her) own knowledge and skills in the pursuit of his [or her] own 
purposes in any manner which seemed appropriate to him [or her]." 
(NS:p.135} 
Hayek believed the rule of law would evolve from the spont aneous order, 
similar to the development of knowledge and other s oci a l processes. 
Rules or laws share several common attributes; they ar e general and 
abstract, known and certain and be equally applicable to everyone. 
(CL: p. 208-9) Kukathas argues, these attributes particularly generality 
and equality, will not necessarily guarantee the pr otection of the 
individuals private domain. "The constraints imposed by the requirements 
of generality and equality are not sufficient to define the scope of the 
individual's protected domain in any substantive way." (Kukathas: 
1989:p.159) These laws may assure the individual the right of personal 
freedom within a private setting, however it is quite possible universal 
and equal laws, such as a requirement of religious conformity, may 
seriously impinge upon an individual's freedom. Without the exist~nce of 
a separate group of principles or rights, a natural or private domain 
cannot be identified and secured. (Kukathas:1989:p.160) 
When Hayek considered the nature of law he was referring to general 
prescriptive laws forming part of an abstract system of rules. These 
rules were developed through an historical process of deducing 
principles from case law and applying these principles in future 
decisions. Alternatively, law is developed through the application of 
precedence. He regarded legislatively derived law has principally for 
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administrative purposes. But he acknowledged legislation was required to 
modify case law which has been slow to adapt to changed circumstances or 
has developed undesirably (RO:p.88). He held a deep suspicion of 
legislative law, as he believed it was imposed by certain groups that 
had captured the statute process. (RO:p.89) Legislatively derived law is 
untried and intrusive, favouring particular instead of universal 
circumstances. The principal difficulty with law produced through 
legislation lies in the particular outcomes it was designed to achieve, 
this is compared with case law which is considered universal. (NS:p.135) 
Kukathas believes Hayek is unable to provide criteria based on 
independent principles that would act as a comparison with case law, and 
that can be used to judge, by legislators, if case law has developed 
incorrectly or in an unjust fashion. "... [ Hayek J has committed himself 
to the claim that the generality and equality of rules, in satisfying 
the requirements of the rule of law, have also satisfied the 
requirements of justice . " (Kukathas:1989:p.159) The principal objecti on 
centres on the absence of an independent criteria of values, on which 
the legislators are able to compare and judge case law. 
Barry identifies similar objections to Hayek's definition of law. If 
the universal rule of law cannot be considered coercive of individual 
liberty then, "The justification for legal restraints must then li e in 
the claim that they in fact advance liberty rather than restrain it .... 
there is a causal connection between laws which are properly constructed 
and individual liberty." (Barry:1979:p.101) The causal connecti on 
between general rules and liberty is emphasized, as the application of a 
general law can result in a diminishing of individual liberty as opposed 
to all general law being consistent with liberty. Laws must be general 
as rules relating to specific circumstances are commands and therefor e 
coercive. The principal objection to Hayek's concept of law as a 
protector of liberty, relates to the possibility of there being some 
laws, that despite being non-specific, are severely restrictive of 
individual liberty. 
"It would appear that a proper protection for individual libe r ty 
requires a more substantive limitation on what a government can do 
than that contained in the requirement that rules be perfectly 
21 
general and non-discriminatory." (Barry:1979:p.102) 
Similar to Kant's problem with the categorical imperative, Hayek's rule 
of law is unspecific, and has the capacity to intrude upon the 
legitimate rights or the private domain of the individual. The 
application of generality and equality are an inadequate defence of 
individual liberty from potentially coercive laws that would qualify if 
Hayek's definition of law was applied. 
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The Distribution of Liberty 
To conclude this section, the discussion will return to a more 
general debate on different forms of liberty. There are three 
contentious areas in which differing conceptions of liberty affect each 
individual and the functioning of society. They are; the distribution of 
resources enabling greater choice, the role of the state regarding the 
redistribution of resources and the rights of the individual in the area 
of private property. The wealth that has ensued from the development of 
society has resulted in a debate on its distribution. Hayek argues for 
the primacy of individual liberty and rejects the possibility of a 
trade-off. For example, using the state to increase social equality by 
progressive taxation at the expense of a small decrease in individual 
liberty by taxing personal disposable income. 
In response to the debate on the redistribution of resources, 
alternative definitions of liberty will be examined, resulting in a 
definition of liberty which balances the individual right t o choose with 
the need for social cooperation. Using Tim Gray's analysis of freedom, 
he begins with MacCallum's definition of the triadic concept of value-
free liberty. 
"· .. freedom is always (i) of something (the agent) (ii) from 
something (the constraint) (iii) to do something (the objective). 
The meaning of freedom is therefore constrained in the triadic 
formula Xis free from Y to do or be z .... Maccallum argues that 
this is the only concept of freedom, and that differences of 
opinion over liberty turn on different interpretations of what 
(for the purpose of freedom) counts as an agent, a constraint or 
an objective." (Gray T:1990:p.12) 
Maccallum believes his triadic concept is value-free, because it does 
not identify the constraint or the objective with a specific category, 
such as power. Once an identification or association is made, freedom 
becomes value-laden and is then provided with meaning. The differing 
interpr etations are associated with different conceptions of liberty, 
Gray has identified seven, and believes the controversy lies not with 
the triadic concept of liberty itself, instead it is with what 
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constitutes a constraint or an objective. However Gray argues it is 
precisely the controversy over the differing conceptions of an agent, a 
constraint or an objective that forms the disagreement on what 
constitutes the substantive meaning of liberty. (Gray T:1990:p.15) 
Gray has identified seven categories of freedom that differ on what 
constitutes the constraint and the impediment. He has divided them into 
two groups, psychological and social conceptions. These conceptions are 
similar to the intrapersonal or interpersonal conceptions identified 
above, by Hayek. The first group of psychological interpretations 
include freedom as; self-determination, doing what one wants and self-
mastery. The first consists of "freedom as self-determination" implying 
freewill and the capacity to make autonomous decisions (Gray T:1990: 
p. 52). This interpretation is also associated with collective freedom, 
such as independence from a colonial power. The second category is 
"freedom as doing what one wants". However this is restricted to mental 
capacities as translating wants into actions is fraught with practical 
difficulties, not only reconciling the internal conflicting preferences 
of an individual but also reconciling the differing and often competing 
wants of many individuals. (Gray T:1990:p.73) Hayek would probably have 
argued this conception would be destructive of social order and 
difficult to implement even if there were broadly agreed preferences. 
The final category in this group is "freedom as self-mastery" implying 
maturity and a rational, stable sense of self. (Gray T:1990:p.74) The 
four definitions in this category are usually considered personal or 
internal conceptions of liberty and have less relevance in a social 
context consisting of differing interests between individuals. 
The second group in which Gray classifies as social conceptions of 
liberty have a greater degree of relevance, as they try to balance the 
competing demands of people. The first, "freedom as status", implies 
freedom is derived from collective association, Gray argues this 
category is a definition of collective identity rather than individual 
freedom. (Gray T:1990:p.46) The second is "freedom as effective power" 
and involves overcoming impediments rather than removing them. The 
argument against this interpretation consists of power being considered 
quite separate from the concept of liberty. However if effective power 
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is being denied to an individual by another agent, then the individual's 
freedom is being curtailed. (Gray T:1990: p.42-43) 
The third interpretation is "freedom as availabi 1 i ty of choices", 
and emphasises the objective, or Z factor. Essentially the greater then 
the number of choices the greater the freedom. (Gray T:1990:p.31) This 
definition is popular with many New-Right theorists, Hayek is an 
exception, he argues liberty is not measured by the ability to consume. 
This argument favours the market as the only provider of the greatest 
variety of choice for the individual. However this raises the question 
of choice being limited or inappropriate; due to cost, the ability of 
the agent to make the right choice and the possibility of choosing not 
to be free, that would be accepting slavery. It would seem an infinite 
variety of choice is impossible, again each individual is subject to the 
demands and constraints of others. Hayek would argue against this 
definition, as it is not the number of or range of choices available to 
the individual that matters but if the individual has the opportunity to 
act without hindrance or being compelled to choose. Therefore it is the 
process itself and not the number of choices available that determines 
if an individual can be regarded as free. 
Acting without hindrance is Gray's final category of liberty. This 
interpretation is the most well known of the negative concepts of 
liberty and Gray has labelled it as "freedom as an absence of 
impediments". The difference between this definition and that of "an 
absence of coercion", is between the freedom to act without constraint 
and the freedom of not being forced to act against one's will. The 
"absence of impediments" definition has a long history and is linked 
with many prominent philosophers, such as J.S. Mill. It is argued this 
definition would reduce freedom to a void, as a complete absence of 
impediments would result in an individual ceasing to be part of a social 
context. (Gray T:1990:p.20) However Gray replies the ability to do 
something (the Z factor) without constraint exists only as a possibility 
not a certainty. A distinction is made between natural impediments 
(individual ability) and social impediments (availability of resources), 
" we assume that only human beings can be free, so we are to assume 
only human beings can impede freedom." (Gray T:1990:p.22) Some natural 
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impediments such as gravity can never be changed, but either type of 
impediment can be considered restrictive of freedom if it can be removed 
by human agency. 
It is the ability of human agency or society to remove impediments, 
whether they are laws, lack of resources or abilities, that is the true 
determinate of freedom. rt would be unreasonable to expect society to 
supply an infinite number of resources for the provision of all the 
opportunities each individual could possibly want, or to invalidate a 
law simply because one individual could claim that it would interfere 
with his or her actions. 
The distribution of freedom raises important questions, as it is 
impossible for individuals to possess similar assets or abilities, this 
inequality leads to differing levels of freedom in the categories of 
freedom as self-determination and as availability of choices. The act of 
being part of society necessitates a synthesis between achieving 
complete freewill and solving an infinite variety of competing and 
contradictory demands. 
"The nature of politics suggests that it is not only difficult to 
secure agreement on conceptions of need or desert, but also hard 
to ensure, through political processes, distributive outcomes that 
reflect need or desert rather than the power of contending 
interests." (Kukathas:1989:p.130) 
It is difficult to determine which right or freedom has precedence, but 
it is something that is continuously attempted by all societies to 
maintain a balance between competing interests including those of the 
powerful and the powerless. 
One of -the principle areas of contention is that of private 
property. This includes ones labour and physical resources such as 
houses and businesses, that is recognised by law as an individual having 
autonomy within a fixed boundary. A justifiable case of restraint can be 
made against taxation as having a negative impact on personal freedom as 
well as the many government laws and regulations that are intended to 
prevent harm and encourage cooperation. Alternatively it is possible to 
justify the health and safety of employees, through extensive 
legislation that may severely limit individual courses of action, even 
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though they may freely have entered into a contract. Taxation and 
industrial law are two examples of the state restricting personal 
autonomy over private property and yet these laws improve the quality of 
1 ife for many individuals. Determining the most appropriate levels of 
intervention is usually defined by the current attitudes of society, 
these are based on fluctuating interpretations of individual rights and 
entitlements. But it would seem most people have accepted, that as 
citizens of a state, they must cooperate and surrender a portion of 
their liberty to improve society as a whole. 
This debate forms part of the negative and positive interpretations 
of liberty, those of the negative school of thought, such as Hayek, 
maintain their interpretation encourages personal responsibility and not 
social res pons ibi 1 i ty. "Liberty not only means that the individual has 
both the opportunity and the burden of choice; it also means that he [or 
she J must bear the consequences of his [ or her 1 actions ... " (CL: p. 71) 
Negative theorists have argued the development of the welfare state has 
undermined individual responsibility by preempting decisions that should 
be of individual concern. 
"Hayek's concern was to show how welfarist policies 
implemented in the wrong way would produce a psychological change 
of attitude in people which would undermine the spirit of liberty 
which is required for the continuation of the spontaneous order. 
Evidence for this might in fact be relevant, and Hayek produces 
some, but it is of a rather anecdotal kind and not all that 
convincing." (Barry:1979:p.185) 
Another objection, by Hayek, to state intervention in the redistribution 
of resources and indirectly liberty is the impossibility of aggregating 
individual liberty and thereby redistributing it. 
"While an equality of rights under a limited government is 
possible and an essential condition of individual freedom, a claim 
for equality of material position can be met only by a government 
with totalitarian powers." (MSJ:p.83) 
The existence of private property is central to the discussion on 
the nature of freedom. Negative liberals believe private property 
enhances freedom and prevents coercion by the state, it also provides 
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status and independence for all individuals. However communitarians 
believe private property acts as a system of restraint. Although an 
individual is free to use his or her property they are unfree, in the 
sense of not being allowed to use the private property of others. (Gray 
T:1990:p.146-7) Milton Friedman argued any redistribution is inherently 
incompatible with freedom while a counter-argument insists a 
redistribution adjusts the structures of freedoms and unfreedoms entered 
into by people during voluntary exchanges. (Gray T:1990:p.151) Which 
ever approach is accepted, those that believe in the inviolability of 
private property and those who seek to redistribute it, are each 
advocating a curtailment of individual liberty in one form or another. 
Property forms part of the protected domain that is crucial to 
Hayek's social theory, 
"The protected domain the essential condition of a liberal social 
order, includes property; law, liberty and property are regarded 
as inseparable. That property precedes civilisation, and is a 
prerequisite of a rule governed society, Hayek maintains is a 
scientific truth." (Barry:1979:p.61) 
The link between liberty and property is not as inseparable as Hayek 
would have us believe. It is possible to live in a dictatorship ruled by 
martial law or arbitrary decree and still own private property, although 
the certainty of continuing ownership would be indeterminate and the 
level of personal freedom would be considerably less than in a 
democratic society. Hayek believed private property or the exclusive 
control over certain material objects to achieve a course of action is 
an essential condition for the protection of liberty. Yet Hayek 
cautioned, "The important point ls that the property should be 
sufficiently dispersed so that the individual is not dependent on 
particular persons who alone can provide him [or her] with what he [or 
she] needs or who alone can employ him [or her]." (CL:p.141) The problem 
is how to maintain an acceptable level of dispersal. Competition alone 
wi 11 be inadequate, surely the state is required to intervene . Barry 
argues Hayek' s methodology fails to provide an answer on the public-
pr i vate mix of property that is required for successful social order. 
(Barry:1979:p.62) 
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In summary, private property forms part of the protected domain 
inseparable from liberty and law. Unjustifiable coercion occurs when the 
rules delimiting this domain are transgressed. As long as an individual 
is not subject to the commands of an agent that has the sole control of 
objects required by the individual to achieve his or her goals, then the 
individual cannot be considered coerced. "The crucial point about 
Hayek' s position . . . is that he asserts that liberty is not to be 
disaggregated. Freedom to dispose of one's goods (whether by goods or 
exchange) is no less important a freedom than the freedom to speak or to 
associate " (Kukathas:1989:p.144) In Hayek's concept of liberty 
there can be no trade-off between one individual's freedom to own and 
control property and another individual's right to greater opportunities 
and choice through state intervention. The definition of freedom as an 
absence of arbitrary coercion requires an additional 
individual is restrained by his or her capabilities, 
differing levels of choice between the powerful and 
component. An 
however, the 
the powerless 
requires the inclusion of freedom as self-determination. Individuals are 
restrained by a scarcity of resources that requires a preferential 
ordering of wants, the state acts as an arbitrator between the competing 
preferences of individuals. Consequently, the reliance on competition as 
an antidote of coercion is an inadequate compromise for the powerless 
individual. 
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PART II 
COERCION 
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Hayek interprets liberty as an absence of arbitrary coercion. The 
second part of this thesis will consider the possible implications for 
this negative concept of liberty. Examining the context in which Hayek 
considered coercive behaviour could occur and if there are circumstances 
where coercion is justifiable by the state, market or other individuals. 
A complete absence of coercion from fellow individuals is an 
impossible situation for any individual to achieve, and Hayek recognised 
this. Social conventions, laws and organisational rules all regulate our 
behaviour. 
"We cannot prevent all harm that a person may inflict upon 
another, or even all the milder forms of coercion to which life in 
close contact with other men [or women] exposes us; but this does 
not mean we ought not to try to prevent all the more severe forms 
of coercion, or that we ought not to define liberty as the absence 
of such coercion." (CL:p.139) 
The individual is a participant with others in society, situated within 
a historical context of communality and from the necessity of s oci a l 
cohesion, must follow a minimum of social rules and law, which by 
necessity entail a degree of coercion. Kukathas argues, that Hayek 
sought to distinguish between two forms of coercion, " morally 
illegitimate actions, such as threats, which are coercive, and morally 
legitimate actions such as conditional offers, which are not coercive." 
(Kukathas:1989:p.150) Hayek was not always successful in separating the 
two definitions when considering their practical implications. This will 
be discussed below in coercion by the state. The important issue 
Kukathas raises, is the difficulty Hayek had in specifying the 
individual's private domain which could be considered justifiably 
protected and free from coercion. 
Hayek believed that limiting coercion, especially by a socialist 
state, allows all individuals the opportunity to discover knowledge and 
contribute their ideas. "Coercion thus is bad because it prevents a 
person from using his [ or her J mental powers to the full and 
consequently from making the greatest contribution that he [or she] is 
capable of to the community." (CL:p.134) The ability of individuals to 
discover not only improves society, but in addition living in a social 
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environment as free as possible from arbitrary coercion must increase 
the autonomy of the individual and in so doing their sense of self-
worth. The atomist-holist debate between the necessity for unity of 
purpose to achieve a prosperous and progressive society and the need for 
individual autonomy to create a diversity of ideas for society's 
renewal, has not been solved by Hayek's insistence upon the competitive 
market as a non-coercive structure. The state can act as a facilitator 
of economic and social development, by acting as a stabilising 
influence, between the sudden changes characteristic of a market 
economy. These sudden changes of economic fortune can be militated by a 
welfare state that distributes resources amongst its citizens and 
alleviates possible coercive employment situations. 
Coercion has a pejorative meaning, implying a lack of freewill on 
the part of the individual and is therefore damaging . to the discovery 
process. However each individual is constrained in his or her choices 
and abilities and sometimes an individual is compelled to act. Haye k 
s ought to describe acceptable limitations or justifiable coercion 
placed, by s ociety, upon an individual's freedom. Using the example of a 
social convention, such as a suitable standard of dress and behaviour 
required at a social function before being admitted, this situation 
cannot legitimately be considered severely coercive. "So long as the 
services of a particular per son are not crucial to my existence or the 
preservation of wha t I mo s t va lue, the conditi ons he [or she exacts] for 
rendering these services cannot properly be called 'coercion'." 
(CL:p.136) Kukathas notes, one difficulty is determining what is crucial 
to an individuals existence and sense of value. This varies between 
individuals and cultures, as 
different set of preferences 
1989:p.152) 
each individual or group will have a 
of what they most value. (Kukathas: 
This discussion on freedom as an absence of coercion is primarily 
concerned vi th the economic power of the individual. Hayek has 
cat egorised and discus sed t hree forms of c oercive behavi our by groups 
and indiv idua l s ; co ercion by a monopolist, coercion by the state and 
coercion by a social group (specifically an occupational union). The 
first category is considered the least harmful, by Hayek, as coercive 
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monopolies or oligopolies covering essential goods or services are rare 
and usually defused eventually by a competitive market. Monopolies of 
non-essential goods or services imply an individual has a choice and 
cannot be considered forced into purchasing them. The last two 
categories are considered more insidious. The state, although recognised 
as a legitimate user of force by its citizens to maintain order, because 
of this very acceptance as a necessity for ordered 1 i fe, the state 
becomes capable of controlling and directing with little effective 
dissent. The last category considered by Hayek is trade unions, 
unsurprisingly they are found to be injurious to individual liberty by 
compelling workers to belong and acting coercively to attain their 
goals. 
Before exploring Hayek's theory in greater detail, there are several 
small issues to be clarified. Hayek makes the distinction between an 
individual being compelled by nature to act as if coerced, and that of 
another human agent forcing an individual to respond and submit to the 
will of that agent. Therefore the term, an agent, refers specifically to 
the intention of coercing the individual to do what the agent or coercer 
commands. Whereas it is possible to state, that individuals are forced 
or compelled by natural disasters to alter their lives, it would not be 
correct to state they have been coerced. (CL:p.133) 
A second point concerns the nature of coercion. The threat of 
physical force is implicit when considering all forms of coercion, 
although Hayek primarily considers the psychological aspect. 
"Coercion implies, however, that I still choose but that my mind 
is made someone else's tool, because the alternatives before me 
have been so manipulated that the _conduct that the coercer wants 
me to choose becomes for me the least painful one. Although 
coerced, it is still I who decide which is the least evil under 
the circumstances." (CL:p.133) 
Therefore the defining characteristic of coercive behaviour, is 
threatening or intimidating behaviour nearly always implying violent 
force, although their are other forms, such as blackmail that can prove 
just as effective. The coerced individual is left in no doubt as to the 
perpetrators intentions and complying becomes the only alternative. 
33 
Monopolies 
It has been argued, that through the operation of the market, 
individuals are compelled to participate, despite being unequal in 
bargaining power, thus creating severe inequalities in outcomes. Central 
to Hayek' s defense of this argument, is that choice for the individual 
is made available through the existence of innumerable actors in the 
exchange process, the many buyers and sellers create competition and 
this process is formed through a basis of voluntary participation, 
implying freewill and adequate knowledge and ability by the actors. "It 
is clear that Hayek wants to reserve the use of the word coercion to 
describe very special situations and avoid its use in situations where 
an individual merely has some choice in a range of rather unpleasant 
options." (Barry:1979:p.72) Coercive behaviour will only arise if there 
is monopolistic control of an essential resource with all other 
alternative sources of supply unavailable. Although monopolistic 
coercion is not defined exactly as a threat using physical force, the 
consequences are so dire that a failure to cooperate would leave an 
individual in a considerably worse state. Hayek uses an example of a 
spring at an oasis, if alternative supplies of water are unavailable, 
then the property owner in control of the spring exercises complete 
coercion (CL:p.136). Miller argues, that once Hayek acknowledged the 
possibility of coercive behaviour on the part of a supplier then similar 
behavi our may occur even in situations of relative, as opposed to 
absolute, scarcity, 
"Finally, Hayek appears to put the cat among the pigeons when he 
concedes that in certain circumstances economicpo1r1er might be 
used in a coercive manner. Once the possibility has been conceded, 
why restrict the circumstances as narrowly as Hayek does, 
confining them to extreme cases where an individual enjoys a 
monopol y of a vital resource? Why not admit the distribution of 
r esource s is always going to be relevant to the distribution of 
ne ga t ive liberty in a society?" (Miller:1991:p.15) 
Barry agrees," his [Hayek'sl restrictive definition of coercion 
leaves out certain sorts of activities which may be regarded as coercive 
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on other, equally plausible, definitions." (Barry:1979:p.72) If a buyer 
or seller ceases to have relatively competitive choices then a mild form 
of coercion must occur. Any 1 imitation placed on the buyer of an 
essential commodity, whether it is cost or forcible restraint, must be 
regarded as severely coercive. 
Hayek argues the solution to coercive monopolistic control, is 
insisting the price of the essential good or service being the same for 
all buyers. (CL:p.136) However, this reliance on preventing price 
discrimination is inadequate for those unable to afford the article or 
service in the first instance, an objection Hayek seems to overlook. 
Hayek also believes, ensuring the same price for all prevents coercion 
on the part of the state. He does not fully develop the reasoning for 
this, but presumably the state or monopolist cannot be considered to be 
acting coercively if all buyers are paying the same exorbitant price. 
Hoy a rgues, 
"If Hayek means that whenever an essential commodity comes under 
monopoly ownership the owner should automatically be required t o 
charge each customer the same price, then the question of what 
price is coercive is moot because then the price charged is not 
the criterion by which we apply this sanction, but rather the 
condition of monopoly and the control of an essential commodity 
a re the criteria by which the sanction are applied." 
(Hoy:1984:p.20) 
Despite being regulated, if a monopolist in control of an essential 
resource is the only agent involved when determining a price, then the 
buyers are at the mercy of the monopolist. "··· how do we determine the 
price to be charged for a good or service that is 'crucial · to my 
existence', since, as Hayek reminds us, there is no such thing as a just 
price?" (Kukathas:1989:p.152) Furthermore, Kukathas argues, that if 
there are several sellers but all charge a monopoly price, that is a 
cartel, then they too are considered to be acting coercively. 
Developing further on the concept of voluntary behaviour, the 
reli ance on mutual agreement between individuals and organisations i s an 
essential supporting argument for Hayek' s interpretation of the 
capitalist economy. Although we may not always approve of the situation 
35 
OI type of choices that are available to us, we must cooperate to 
survive. If there exists a choice, however 1 imi ted, in whatever course 
of action we undertake, then we cannot be considered as being coerced. 
"Life in society necessarily means that we are dependent for the 
satisfaction of most of our needs on the services of some of our 
fellows; in a free society these mutual services are voluntary, 
... The benefits and opportunities which our fellows offer to us 
will be available only if we satisfy their conditions." (CL:p.135) 
To prevent coercion all agreements, such as employment or the 
purchasing of goods, should be voluntary and if the economy is 
competitive and expanding the increasing variety of choice will 
alleviate possible control over a sector by an individual or 
organisation. A recessionary economy limits opportunities, especially in 
the labour market, and Hayek acknowledges an employer may act coercively 
in periods of high unemployment, 
"In periods of acute unemployment the threat of dismissal may be 
used to enforce actions other than those originally contracted 
for .... But such conditions, though not impossible, would, at the 
worst, be rare exceptions in a prosperous competitive society." 
(CL :p.137) 
It would seem unsatisfactory to leave possible coercive situations 
experienced by employees to the vagaries of the economic cycle. In 
response, since the nineteenth century there has been a continuous 
development of complex industrial law in advanced capitalist economies 
to alleviate any severe power imbalances between employers and 
employees. In addition the development of consumer protection law, would 
seem to be a result of changing social attitudes to what is considered 
just. Extrapolating from Hayek' s social theory these laws could be 
considered part of the evolutionary process for a prosperous society. 
However they could also be considered as an unwarranted infringement on 
the rights of individuals to enter into contracts, thereby creating a 
greater anomaly by using state institutions to prevent the efficient 
operation of the market, no matter how unpleasant. 
Hayek's theory is imprec ise in this situation, as to which can be 
considered the most deleterious towards individual liberty. It would 
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' seem difficult to imagine the rescinding of much of the labour and 
consumer protection legislation, because of the level of acceptance 
through out society over a number of decades, even though this 
legislation interferes considerably with the operation of a competitive 
market. However Hayek believes an individual is not coerced when in a 
situation of having to accept low paying employment, 
"So long as the act that as placed me in my predicament is not 
aimed at making me do or not do specific things, so long as the 
intent of the act that harms me is not to make me serve another 
person's ends, its effect on my freedom is not different from that 
of any natural calamity ... " (CL:p.137) 
It would seem Hayek disagrees with many aspects of labour protection 
legislation. However the complex nature of an industrialised society 
requires all individuals to participate in the monetary system. As long 
as individuals are required to rely on paid employment for their needs, 
then it is society's obligation t o pr ovide empl oyment or s ome other form 
of income support for their livelihood. 
The assessment, by Hayek, of possible coercive situations in the 
labour market is indicative of a dogmatism inherent in many neo-liberal 
theories. Principally, no matter the conditions of employment, a worker 
cannot be said to be forced into accepting inadequate wages and 
conditions. Certainly a growing economy will improve the standard of 
employee remuneration, by providing an increasing choice of workplace 
and an increase in the real price of labour. However the very nature of 
employment is to "serve anothers ends", even though an agreement has 
been entered into voluntarily, in exchange for remuneration the employee 
sells his or her labour power. The neo-liberal tradition fails to 
recognise the fundamental power imbalance between an individual employee 
and employer, whose primary mode of support is the selling of his or her 
labour, in a market process that only values labour based on its 
scarcity. Generally it can be stated the strategic bargaining power lies 
with the employer. As a result of this inequality in the bargaining 
process, this in itself has been recognised by society, various 
structures have evolved, such as; trade unions, legislation protecting 
the rights of individual workers and specialised courts and tribunals to 
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adjudicate on disputes. These institutions, can be described as coercive 
structures, but they exist to prevent a greater diminishing of 
individual liberty for the less powerful worker, than otherwise would be 
the case. 
It would seem Hayek regards the possible coercion of an individual 
worker in an employment situation as a mild form of coercion, compared 
to a severe form such as violent extortion. However Hayek is in greater 
difficulty when he ignores the substantial amount of legislation 
existing in many countries protecting workers rights and by implication 
their liberty. Surely this particular type of legislation has evolved 
and been accepted as creating a social go od, in the sense that its 
provision benefits all of society. This outweighs the freedom of an 
employer and cannot be undone by claims of interference in the 
competitive market order. 
Hayek was aware of the existence of market imperfections, such as 
producer monopolies and differentiated between two type s . The first, 
monopolies characterised as efficient, perhaps due to economies of 
scale, are favourable because competition is unava i l able . As long as 
they do not engage in price discrimination they need not be restricted 
because they are efficient. The second type are monopolies which have 
gained an advantage due to privileges granted by the state, this 
category includes unions, firms granted subsidies or tariff protection. 
Hayek believed these privileges should be dispersed, through competition 
It is inevitable monopolies will form, instead of insisting on 
government regulation through price control Hayek believed if a market 
controlled by a monopolist had no barriers to entry from potential 
competitors then monopolistic practice is acceptable. 
"Monopoly ls certainly undesirable, but only in the same sense in 
which scarcity is undesirable, in neither case does this mean that 
we can avoid it. It is one of the unpleasant facts of life that 
certain capacities ... cannot be duplicated, as it is a fact that 
certain goods are scarce." (CL:p.265) 
In e ff ect monopoli es ar e not coercive unless they pr event an individua l 
from acting in a way that is crucial to his or her existence. Efficient 
monopolies are unavoidable but those guaranteed by government patronage 
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should be open to competition. 
Coercion by the State 
The state is a coercive apparatus, whose purpose should be the 
prevention of severe coercion, or the prevention of arbitrary coercion 
by an individual or group towards another individual or group. This 
primarily involves enforcing laws to prevent or prosecute criminal acts. 
The domestic sphere forms part of the private or protected domain, and 
will be discussed in greater detail below, Hayek maintained, that 
domestic concerns should be excluded from state control. Briefly his 
reasoning was, that if domestic relations are purely voluntary, then the 
state has no right to intervene. "But here the society can do little to 
protect the individual beyond making such associations with others truly 
voluntary." (CL:p.138) This is difficult to achieve, unles s all 
individuals have the means or resources to be independent and t hi s would 
require intervention by the state, only then can domestic relationships 
be considered voluntary. 
Hayek placed considerable importance on the assurance of a "private 
sphere", protected from coercion. This principally consists of private 
property or the control and utilisation of the means to do what one 
wants. The concept of a private sphere or domain where, "The 
"legitimacy" of one's expectations or the "rights" of the individual are 
the result of the recognition of such a private sphere." (CL:p.139) This 
would appear the closest reference Hayek has made comparing the private 
sphere with a natural rights based interpretation of liberty, that is, 
certain inalienable rights all individuals are entitled to. The private 
domain consists of material objects (private property), labour and 
general rules which delimit the domain by guaranteeing security of 
tenure, but in some circumstances the boundaries could be adjusted. 
"In modern society, however, the essential requisite for the 
protection of the individual against coercion is not that he [or 
she) possess property but that the material means which enable him 
[or her) to pursue any plan of action should not be all in the 
exclusive control of one other agent." (CL:p.140) 
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The necessary conditions for the functioning of private property are; 
the existence of many actors for mutual exchange and general rules to 
enforce voluntarily entered contracts. The necessity for rules on 
private property and contracts are a result of scarce resources and 
their utilisation that is required to produce goods and services. 
(CL:p.141) The reliance Hayek places on the existence of competition 
between market participants, is an inadequate defence and an 
insufficient assurance that coercion within the market process will not 
occur. There are problems concerning negative externalities, such as 
pollution, and Hayek concedes a form of government regulation is 
required. The state has also been required to fund and provide public 
goods, such as compulsory education. These goods generally create 
beneficial externalities for society as a whole, by providing equality 
of opportunity and contributing to the technological and social advance 
of society. 
Public goods are not as easily delimited as the private sphere, 
although Hayek recognised the necessity for their provision and the 
difficulty private individuals or groups had in supplying and charging 
for such public goods, as roads. 
"A public good is a commodity or service whose benefits are not 
depleted by an additional user and for which it is generally 
difficult or impossible to exclude people from its benefits, even 
if they are willing to pay for them." (Baumol&Blinder:1988:p.639) 
For example, with the provision of street lighting, everyone gains a 
benefit from having street lights, but the cost of provision cannot be 
apportioned between the individuals who use them. The problem of funding 
public goods requires an enforcing structure, such as the state, that 
can legitimately demand payment for public goods. Therefore provision is 
equitable if everyone accepts and complies with the conditions for their 
supply. 
Perhaps rules and regulations, such as labour market and consumer 
protection legislation, share similar characteristics to public goods. 
Unlike public goods that have a 'free-rider' problem, legislation 
relating to health and safety measures requires compliance by all groups 
to ensure costs are apportioned equitably. The resulting beneficial 
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externalities, similar to public goods, improve the quality of life for 
all. For example, if a manufacturer decreased the output pr ice on a 
product by cutting safety measures, competitors would be forced to 
follow and maintain market share, thereby undermining safety measures. 
The insistence on all complying with safety regulations can be 
considered a public good, in the sense that all manufacturers must obey 
to ensure their provision. But only a legal requirement, by the state, 
threatening sanctions, forces individual manufacturers to comply. 
Alternatively labour legislation relating to minimum pay and conditions, 
and other regulations, interfere with the operation of a competitive 
labour market. Hayek would have disagreed with any regulations that set 
a minimum wage rate, and yet the increasing benefits, through greater 
power and consequently liberty, for the individual workers are real. The 
existence of these rules and their compliance, are subject to current 
social attitudes and consensus on the appropriate levels of protection 
for 'powerless' workers. 
The financing of public goods requires a third party in the 
competitive market-place. The state as a law-making institution is 
empowered, through general laws applicable to everyone on an equal 
basis, to legislate on the raising of taxes and also ensuring the 
compliance with compulsory services, such as jury duty. (CL:p.143) Hayek 
sought to differentiate between the functioning of government as a 
distributor of resources and the limiting of coercion through law 
enforcement. "It is true the that the non-coercive or purely service 
activities that government undertake are usually financed by coercive 
means." (CL:p.144) But it would be impractical for the situation to be 
otherwise, not all taxpayers would agree on the provision of certain 
government services, such as defence, but all must comply. 
As discussed above, Kukathas believes Hayek is imprecise in defining 
coercion in these terms, either all coercive actions are morally wrong, 
or some morally sound actions can be deemed coercive, (Kukathas:1989: 
p .149) Hayek favours both approaches. This problem involves the proper 
functioning of government. All individuals belong to a society ruled by 
a government, the association exists automatically and is not voluntary. 
Therefore legitimate actions by a government are coercive, but they are 
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in many circumstances morally justifiable. 
"The conceptual inconsistency is important because, if the 
protected sphere is to be identified by arguing that actions do 
not infringe that sphere only when they are not coercive, there 
can be no distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable 
coercion unless it can be conceded that it can be justifiable to 
invade the protected sphere." (Kukathas:1989:p.150-1) 
The inviolability of the protected sphere would therefore be undermined. 
Kukathas claims Hayek fails to specify what constitutes coercion and 
coercive actions that effect the individual's protected domain. A 
different criteria is required, such as a written constitution 
delineating individual rights, instead of relying on the protection of 
general and abstract laws. The principal role and justification of the 
state is to only use coercive measures to prevent arbitrary coercion. 
The provision of general rules must be predictable and applicable to 
all, including the state. (CL:p.143) The nature of these rules or laws 
and their evolvement and public acceptance are, in this respect, crucial 
to the justification of coercion by the state in the protected domain of 
the individual. 
The other principal role of the state as a distributor of resources, 
through such measures as taxation or compulsorily funded social 
services, greatly disturbed Hayek. The growth of the welfare state in 
the latter half of the twentieth century is well known. Hayek recognised 
the benefits of ensuring compulsory provision for retirement, illness 
and unemployment. His principal objection was the coercive monopolistic 
control governments had acquired in their financing and provision, he 
believed this task should be undertaken by private institutions. 
(CL:p.296) 
Coercion by Labour Unions 
Hayek sought to differentiate between various forms of monopolistic 
practice and in effect he tolerated enterprise monopoly as undesirable 
but inevitable until changing technology allowed other competitors to 
enter the monopolists market. However, with labour union monopolies, 
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Hayek sought to obviate their control which he regarded as extremely 
coercive. "I have, however, become convinced that it would be 
disingenuous to represent the existing monopolies in the field of labour 
and those in the field of enterprise as being of the same kind." 
(CL:p.265) 
The development of unions, Hayek argued, lead to a failure by 
governments to restrict their activities by granting them exemptions 
from the law, resulting in what he considered coercive practices. The 
abuse of power, using such measures as violent picketing and closed 
shops, whereby non-union labour is excluded from workplaces, he regarded 
with hostility. Hayek was not against unions as voluntary associations, 
he simply believed they should be recognised as groups with legitimate 
interests and rights of association, who should be restrained by 
competing interests. (CL:p.268) Thus workers should have a choice in 
which group they wish to join and represent them. It is the coercion 
employed by unions to force individual workers to join that offended 
him, 
"It cannot be stressed enough that the coercion which unions have 
been permitted to exercise contrary to all principle of freedom 
under the law is primarily the coercion of fellow workers .... the 
coercion of employers would lose much of its objectionable 
character if unions were deprived of this power to exact unwilling 
support." (CL:p.269) 
The nature of the individual employee-employer relationship is 
unbalanced and weighted in favour of the employer, collective bargaining 
that has the unanimous support of the workers greatly improves their 
barga_ining position. Individual workers are in a less powerful 
negotiating position. 
A primary concern, of Hayek' s, was to ensure the level of wages 
vi thin a particular workplace were commensurate with the market rate, 
closed-shop practices pushed up the wage rate, excluding workers outside 
the unionised workplace from competing at a lower wage level more 
closely aligned with the current market rate. "Unions that had no power 
to coerce outsiders would thus not be strong enough to force up wages 
above the level at which all seeking work could be employed," (CL:p.270) 
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Similarly, picketing is regarded as intimidation and severely 
coercive, " ... it represents a kind of organized pressure upon 
individuals which in a free society no private agency should be 
permitted to exercise." (CL:p.275) Closed shops are considered a 
restriction on trade and should not be exempt from unfair trade 
practices. 
"Hayek claims that closed-shop agreements are contracts in 
restraint of trade and should not therefore be enforced at law . 
. . . almost any contract can be interpreted as a restraint of trade 
and, furthermore any law that specifically banned voluntarily made 
closed-shop agreements would be, as a matter of logic, as 
discriminatory and coercive as a law which made them obligatory." 
(Barry:1979:p.74) 
Certainly an employer who voluntarily entered into a closed-shop 
agreement could be at a competitive disadvantage to those employers who 
did not. Hayek states "... this principle can never mean that all 
contracts will be legally binding and enforceable." (CL:p.279) The only 
criterion is that all contracts must be subject to the same general 
rules, clearly Hayek regards closed-shop agreements as invalid because 
they restrain competitive trade, this objection applies to any contract, 
not just closed-shop agreements. Hayek be 1 ieved competition was the 
crucial determinant in support of the individual's freedom to act. It is 
not the range of choice available, but the individual's ability to 
utilise his or her talents and material resources to achieve their own 
particular ends. 
There are legitimate functions of unions, recognised by Hayek, 
principally wage determination, this includes setting wage differentials 
securing benefits, such as health care. Also generally facilitating the 
smooth operation of the workplace, by implementing rules determined with 
employee participation. "The most effective way of securing consent is 
probably to have the general scheme agreed to in collective negotiations 
in which all the different interests are represented. (CL:p.276) 
Unions cannot be denied freedom of association, and Hayek believed 
unions had legitimate interests that could be socially beneficial, but 
unions had to be restrained by being exposed to the rule of law and 
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competitive practices. Hayek sought to ban the practice of intimidating 
picketing and allow individual workers the right to choose if they 
wished to belong to a union. 
"The essential requirement is that freedom of association be 
assured and that the coercion be treated as equally illegitimate 
whether employed for or against organization, by the employer or 
by the employees." (CL:p.278) 
Essentially any restriction of trade is unjustifiable, employers should 
be able to employ any individual as close to the market-clearing price 
as possible, if workers are employed at higher wage rates this produces 
involuntary unemployment. However this assumes individual employers and 
employees have perfect knowledge of all possible wage prices available. 
Also it is difficult to determine if complete price flexibility will 
diminish unemployment. There are many other contributing factors, such 
as skill shortages, levels of demand which determine the level of 
unemployment. In summary, Hayek was against compulsory membership of 
unions and advocated a restriction on any coercive practices by unions 
that could restrain competitive agreements. 
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Conclusion 
. 
There can be little disagreement on the concept of individual 
freedom being situated within a social context of often contradictory 
and competing ends. The boundaries of personal freedom must be 
delineated to allow for the maximum possible amount of individual 
liberty while ensuring an equal amount of fundamental liberty for all 
other members of a society. This involves the choosing of restraints 
that are acceptable to all. 
Hayek 's definition of individual liberty forms the basis of his 
social theory. As the supreme principle, liberty exists prior to other 
principles, yet Hayek links liberty inextricably with the rule of law 
and social progression. But he disdains any link with other values, such 
as social equality and social justice. (Gray J:1989p.97) He is incorrect 
when judging liberty, law and property as more valuable than social 
justice. 
The precise definition of liberty, as an absence of arbitrary 
coercion, is inadequate for social progression. Individual liberty is 
more than the assurance of not being forced to act and follow the will 
of another. Freedom consists of an absence of impediments combined with 
the ability of self-determination within an agreed context of resource 
distribution. An exact equality of resources between individuals is 
impossible to achieve, however the individual that is rendered powerless 
through an inabilty to pursue his or her particular goals is less free 
than an individual that can. Hayek disdained the concept of liberty as 
power. But society, developing through the spontaneous order, makes 
values judgements by an agreement of political will. Altering the 
outcomes of the market process, by improving the amount of liberty 
experienced by the powerless. The increase in opportunities in such 
areas as health and education also has a beneficial effect for society 
as a whole. 
Hayek's reliance on laws being automatically just, if they satisfy 
the attributes listed by Hayek is an inadequate protection against laws 
that are detrimental to individual liberty. This assumes the derivation 
of law is free of distortion from vested interests that may have 
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considerable influence over the legislative and judicial procedures, 
whether it is formed from statute or case law. The making of law is as 
liable for capture, by special interest groups for their advantage, as 
any other social process. 
The attributes concerning the rule of law identified by Hayek, "··· 
they must be general rules of individual conduct, applicable to all 
alike in an unknown number of future instances, defining the protected 
domain of the individuals, and therefore essentially of the nature of 
prohibitions rather than of specific commands." (NS:p.135), results in a 
failure to ensure the possibility of oppressive general and equal laws 
being enacted. Barry, Kukathas and Gray all believe Hayek 's theory of 
law requires an additional group of moral principles, that can be used 
as a compar lson, in determining the justness and appropr lateness of the 
rule of law. This would be similar to a written constitution acceptable 
to all, incorporating an entrenched Bill of Rights to be used as a 
reference for solving future problems concerning the conflicting rights 
and freedoms of the individual. 
In addition the private domain, consisting of the freedom to control 
one's property and labour and secured by the law of contract, fails to 
secure the freedom of the individual, as the boundaries are variable. 
The individual cannot be assured that the protected domain will be free 
of intrusion, if the criterion of freedom as an absence of arbitrary 
coercion is used, then it is quite possible to envisage many 
circumstances whereby the state is justified in intruding within the 
private domain. One such example, ls the prevention of domestic 
violence. The private domain as a protector of individual liberty is 
inadequate. 
The inevitability of con fl let ing r lghts and freedoms requires the 
existence of an adjudicating body, capable of deciding the most 
appropriate distribution of 1 iberty and enforcing comp! iance with its 
decisions. The only suitable structure ls a democratic state, as it ls 
the only legitimate constitutive and enforcing structure acceptable 
agredd by everyone. In theory all individuals have the ability to 
influence the outcomes of government, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy 
of the role of the state. The state reflects the current set of social 
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values, derived from an historical process, its ability to sanction and 
alter the outcomes produced by the operation of the market ensures a 
considerable involvement, that Hayek attempts to deny or at least 
curtail. 
The role of the state has been gradually increased to encompass the 
prevention and regulation of monopolies, a principal infringer of 
personal freedom on the part of the consumer. The reliance Hayek places 
on competition, as a disperser of privilige and power underestimates the 
ability of particular groups or individuals to control or coerce. 
The other principal role of the state, consists as a provider of 
public goods, externalities the private sector is either unwilling or 
unable to provide. Included in this group are laws relating to labour 
and consumer protection, although these cannot be classified as a public 
good, their existence is only guaranteed through the compulsory 
requirements of state legislation which compel producers to conform t o 
the prescribed standards. The development of the welfare state, can als o 
be argued, is a response to the necessary requirements individuals have 
in improving their education and health, amongst other social goods. 
This has an additional positive externality, caused by improving the 
range of opportunities for self-determination and thereby increas ing 
individual liberty overall . Hayek's attempts to undermine the 
theoretical justification for these entitlements by asserting freedom is 
not dependent upon the number of choices available or liberty as power 
concepts. The removing of impediments to individual action, fails to 
recognise the inequalities caused by restricted access, usually due to 
an absence of wealth, this usually determines opportunities and chances. 
Hayek argued that just rules of conduct developed through a gradual 
process of trial and error within the spontaneous order, surely the 
considerable legislation regulating the operation of the market and the 
emergence of the welfare state to provide protection for individuals, 
has also developed through a similar process within the spontaneous 
or der. Hayek appears sel ec tive in assuming which social processes and 
ins ti tut ions will develop through the spontaneous order, some would 
appear more acceptable than others. Hayek' s attempt to incorporate the 
limited capacity for human reason in a social theory of natural 
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progression cannot exclude those measures designed to improve the 
quality of life for all within a society. 
Hayek's rejection of possible coercive practices within the market 
process, except those relating to essential goods, fails at a 
fundamental level to recognise possible inequalities between the 
participants before a market transaction takes place. If individuals 
within a society . have reached a consensus, formalising a sharing or 
redistribution of resources through such measures as progressive 
taxation, then this must be considered acceptable within Hayek's social 
theory. It is not possible to allow the development of "just rules of 
conduct" without including measures designed to improve the 
opportunities of individuals which directly contributes to an 
improvement in individual liberty. The market process is assumed to be 
competitive, however the economic cycle produces distortions that can 
have an extremely negative effect on individuals limiting their 
opportunities and ability of self -determination. Any concept of liberty 
must incorporate a degree of opportunity for individuals to be able to 
utilise their abilities and lead a rewarding life. 
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